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CAN IN-HOUSE COUNSEL BE TRUSTED
WITH ACCESS TO A COMPETITOR'S
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION?: U.S.
STEEL CORP. v. UNITED STATES
In a typical dumping or countervailing duty investigation, the In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC) and the Commerce Depart-
ment require access to sensitive commercial information.' Al-
' See Garfinkel, Disclosure of Confidential Documents Under the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979: A Corporate Nightmare?, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 465, 467-68 (1981); see
also Note, A Procedural Framework for the Disclosure of Business Records Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 90 YALE L.J. 400, 400 (1980) (large amounts of information
consisting of intricate commercial and financial information submitted by businesses to fed-
eral agencies).
Dumping takes place when exported merchandise is sold at a price below the value at
which the product is sold in the seller's home market. S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
37-38, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 381, 423-24 [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT]. This type of price-cutting can cause great damage to domestic competitors
and can have a detrimental effect on the tariff structure of the importing country. See
Smith, Export Subsidies of the Caribbean Basin and a Proposed Revision of International
Rules Regarding Countervailing Duties, 4 INT'L TRADE: L.J. 124, 125 (1978); see also Butler,
Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in International
Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 83 (1969) (subsidies give exporters unfair competitive advantage
over local manufacturers); Ehrenhaft, What the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act [Can1 [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Pol-
icy, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361, 1362 (1979) (injury results from sales below cost).
Thus, duties are imposed on foreign products when they are sold in the United States at less
than fair value. Ehrenhaft, supra at 1362; Re, Litigation Before the United States Court of
International Trade, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 437, 450-51 (1981).
The same potential for injury to domestic competition forms the basis for counter-
vailing duties, which are imposed on foreign merchandise sold in the United States at low
prices, reflecting subsidies paid to the exporter. SENATE REPORT, supra, at 37, reprinted in
1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 423; Re, supra, at 450-51; Smith, supra, 125. These
subsidies may be furnished by foreign governments, individuals, corporations or associa-
tions. 1 P. FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE GUIDE § 17.01, at 17-3 (1984).
In order to impose an antidumping duty, the Department of Commerce must evaluate
whether the "foreign merchandise is being . . . sold in the United States at less than its fair
value." 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1982); Re, supra, at 451. Fair value is evaluated by a compari-
son to the market price of similar items in the importer's domestic market or in the markets
of other countries. SENATE REPORT, supra, at 37, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 423; 1 P. FELLER, supra, § 18.03, at 18-6. The Commerce Department evaluates the
need for countervailing duties by determining whether foreign subsidies are being received
by the importer. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (1982); Re, supra, at 451-52.
After a finding is made by the Commerce Department that dumping has occurred or
that subsidies have been received, the International Trade Commission (ITC) must deter-
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though these agencies may use this information in determining the
necessity and the amount of a duty assessment, those submitting
the data often are promised that it will be kept confidential.3 The
Court of International Trade has the power to review agency deter-
minations that are alleged to be supported by insufficient evidence
in the administrative record." Since any material used by the
mine whether there has been material injury or the threat of material injury to a United
States industry. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982); Re, supra, at 452. Material injury is defined
as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)
(1982). In making the material injury determination, the ITC must consider the volume of
imports, the impact of the imports on domestic prices for similar merchandise, and the im-
pact of the imports on producers of similar merchandise in the United States. 19 U.S.C. §
1677(7)(B) (1982).
2 See Garfinkel, supra note 1, at 467; Note, Technical Analysis of the Antidumping
Agreement and the Trade Agreements Act, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1405, 1430-31
(1979). There are various points in the administrative process where foreign and domestic
manufacturers and producers are called upon to disclose information that may be valuable
to competitors. See generally Garfinkel, supra note 1, at 467-69 (competitive position vul-
nerable if sensitive information is disclosed). For example, in order to determine whether
"dumping" has occurred, the Commerce Department will require information from the for-
eign exporter or domestic importer of the product allegedly being dumped. Id. at 467; see
Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 114, 114-15 (1980). To determine whether
a United States industry has been injured, the ITC will require data from domestic manu-
facturers and distributors. See id. at 114. The type of information requested by these agen-
cies often includes the usual price charged, sales volume, and current inventory and capac-
ity. Garfinkel, supra note 1, at 467. To determine profits, the agencies will need to know the
costs of production and shipment. See id. Indeed, it is not unusual for questionnaires to
request "the names of particular customers and suppliers, as well as prices of actual transac-
tions." Garfinkel, Confidentiality Poses Problems for In-house Counsel, Legal Times Wash.,
Sept. 15, 1980, at 18, col. 1.
' See, e.g., Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 114, 114 (1980); Connors
Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 112, 112 (1980). Both foreign and domestic busi-
nesses have a substantial interest in assuring that the information they submit is used solely
for agency purposes. See Note, supra note 1, at 400 & n.2. Accordingly, both the ITC and
the Commerce Department have promulgated regulations to determine when they will dis-
close information that has been categorized as "confidential." See Garfinkel, supra note 1, at
472-76. Businesses are particularly concerned that trade secrets not be disclosed to their
competitors. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on Government Disclosure of Private
Trade Secret Information, 56 IND. L.J. 347, 347 (1981) (value of information "arises from
the competitive advantage associated with a competitor's ignorance"). Ironically, it is usu-
ally competitors who need the information to challenge the agency's determination. Garfin-
kel, supra note 1, at 484-85; see infra note 37; cf. Note, supra at 347-50 (business use of
Freedom of Information Act to reveal competitors trade secrets).
" Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. 4, § 516A, 46 Stat. 590 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a
(1982)). Review by the Court of International Trade may be sought by "an interested party
who is a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arises." 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(a)(1)-(2) (1982). "Interested party" is a defined as:
(A) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States im-
porter, of merchandise which is the subject of an investigation under this subtitle
or a trade or business association a majority of the members of which are import-
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agency to reach a decision becomes part of the administrative rec-
ord, 5 the parties to the litigation in the Court of International
Trade may desire that this material be divulged.6 If the informa-
tion is necessary to further the ability of the parties to challenge
the action of the agency, the Court has the power to disclose the
record, including any confidential material contained therein.7 Fre-
ers of such merchandise,
(B) the government of a country in which such merchandise is produced or
manufactured,
(C) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United State of a like
product,
(D) a certified union or recognized union or group of workers which is a repre-
sentative of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or wholesale in
the United States of a like product, and
(E) a trade or business association a majority of whose members manufacture,
produce, or wholesale a like product in the United States.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982); see Note, supra note 2, at 1432. Agency determinations are sub-
ject to attack on the grounds that preliminary determinations are "arbitrary, capricious [or]
an abuse of discretion." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (1982); see Note, supra note 2, at 1433.
Final determinations may be challenged on the grounds that they are "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record." 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B).
' See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1) (1982); Re, supra note 1, at 453. The record for review
used by the Court of International Trade is comprised of all the material presented to or
obtained by the ITC or the Secretary of Commerce, including all government memoranda,
records of ex parte conferences, all transcripts or records of conferences or hearings, and all
notices published in the Federal Register. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A) (1982).
€ See Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 114, 114-15 (1980).
7 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) (1982). Section 1516a(b)(2)(B) provides:
The confidential or privileged status accorded to any documents, comments, or
information shall be preserved in any action under this section. Notwithstanding
the preceding sentence, the court may examine, in camera, the confidential or
privileged material, and may disclose such material under such terms and condi-
tions as it may order.
Id.
A disclosure determination is made by the Court of International Trade after balancing
the litigants' need for the data to respond sufficiently to the prior proceedings, the govern-
ment's need to obtain confidential material in the future, and the need of the entity that
supplied the information to protect confidential information from competitors. See, e.g.,
American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 566.F. Supp. 1538, 1539-40 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983) (citing Freres Corp. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982));
see Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 114, 114-15 (1980); see also Nakajima
All Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 170, 173 (1981) (agencies sought continued confi-
dential treatment of agency material so that future requests for such information would not
be "hamper[ed]"); Melamine Chem., Inc. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 245, 246 (1981)
(government objected to "chilling effect" on future disclosure of information). See generally
Garfinkel, supra note 1, at 482-83 (CIT decisions on disclosure of confidential data).
The Court may issue a protective order limiting disclosure of the record to assure that
the information is used solely for the purposes of the litigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B)
(1982). In addition, the court may condition disclosure in any manner that serves to imple-
ment the competing policies involved. See, e.g., Freres Corp. v. United States, 554 F. Supp.
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quently, the Court will prohibit viewing of the confidential parts of
the agency record by anyone other than the attorneys for the party
requesting access." Recently, in U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States,9
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit resolved that the
Court of International Trade may not deny attorneys access to the
administrative record solely on the basis of their status as in-house
counsel.'0
In U.S. Steel, United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel)
claimed that determinations of countervailing duties owned on car-
bon plate steel from South Africa and Brazil were not supported
by substantial evidence." To litigate this claim, U.S. Steel asserted
it needed access to the administrative record, including financial,
production, and sales data gathered by the agencies.' 2 The South
African and Brazilian competitors of U.S. Steel that had submitted
the information contested disclosure on the ground that the mate-
rial was confidential.' 3
Upon in camera inspection, the Court of International Trade
found that there was "revealing" data in the administrative rec-
ord. 1 4 Applying a balancing test, Judge Watson concluded that
1246, 1248 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (only allowing disclosure of information "directly relevant
to the administrative determinations").
' See, e.g., Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 170, 176 (1981); Japan
Exlan Co. v. United States, 1 Ct. Int'l Trade 286, 288 (1981); Atlantic Sugar Ltd. v. United
States, 85 Cust. Ct. 114, 116 (1980). A typical protective order contains provisions similar to
the order in Connors Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 112 (1980), in which: (1) dis-
closure was limited to lawyers and office personnel working on the litigation; (2) those who
obtained the information could not discuss it with anyone except those authorized by the
order; (3) no copies could be made except as required for the litigation; (4) the material was
to be returned to opposing counsel at the conclusion of the litigation; and (5) the terms
could be modified only with the consent of the defendant or according to a subsequent court
order. Id. at 113. Consultation with experts is also often restricted unless counsel for the
defendant agrees to the "suitability of such experts." Freres Corp. v. United States, 554 F.
Supp. 1246, 1249 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982); Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l
Trade 116, 118 (1981). In addition, the Court may require the expert to promise not to
disclose the material and to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court of International
Trade. See, e.g., Japan ExIan Co., 1 Ct. Int'l Trade at 288.
Nevertheless, should the court find it necessary, the court has the power to deny access
to the attorneys. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) (1982).
9 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10 See id. at 1467, 1469.
11 United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 870, 871 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983).
12 Id. at 871.
13 Id.
14 Id. Writing the opinion of the Court, Judge Watson stated that disclosure of the
information beyond the litigation could result in "significant harm," to U.S. Steel's competi-
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U.S. Steel's need for access to the information outweighed the
competitor's need for confidentiality.'5 The Court, however, noted
a factor that complicated its decision: The request for disclosure
was made by the in-house counsel for U.S. Steel."6 Judge Watson
observed that within the confines of the sustained and intimate re-
lationship between in-house counsel and the corporation, uninten-
tional disclosure by in-house counsel to its client would be impossi-
ble to prevent.'7 In addition, the Court held that requiring U.S.
Steel to retain outside counsel if it wished to pursue the litigation
would not be an unreasonable request.' Notably, subsequent to
the Court's holding, U.S. Steel voluntarily dismissed the action.' 9
In an interlocutory appeal,20 the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit addressed a certified question2 that arose from the de-
tors as its detail and scope rendered it "extremely potent" in the competitive arena. Id.
1 Id. (citing Freres Corp. v. United States, 554 F. Supp. 1246, 1248 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1982); Connors Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 112, 113 (1980)); see supra note 7.
6 569 F. Supp. at 871. Access to confidential information for corporate counsel was
sought by U.S. Steel in an earlier action, but it was dismissed due to mootness in U.S. Steel
Corp. v. United States, No. 82-3-00288 slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade May 9, 1983). Id. At that
time, the argument made by U.S. Steel for disclosure to in-house counsel was described as
"especially compelling" since the corporation was represented solely by in-house counsel in
the proceedings. Lempert, Corporate Counsel Request Equal Access to Data, Legal Times
Wash., Aug. 16, 1982, at 5, col. 1. In this earlier litigation, an amicus brief claiming "unjusti-
fied discrimination against corporate counsel" was filed on behalf of 61 corporations in the
steel, oil, chemical, automotive and other industries. Id.
" See 569 F. Supp at 872. The Court of International Trade followed the reasoning of
the court in Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 133, 133-34 (1980). See 569
F. Supp. at 871-72. In Atlantic Sugar, Canadian refined sugar producers sought access to
questionnaires submitted to the ITC by American producers. 85 Cust. Ct. at 114. The an-
swers contained information concerning financial performance, distribution, sales, and
financial indicators. Id. In-house counsel was denied access to this information. Id. at 116.
The Atlantic Sugar court singled out corporate counsel "to avoid placing [in-house counsel]
under the unnatural and unremitting strain of having to exercise constant self-censorship in
their normal working relations." Id. at 133-34. In U.S. Steel, the Court of International
Trade went one step further by reasoning that it would be impossible for these attorneys to
keep confidential the information that was disclosed to them. 569 F. Supp. at 872.
8 569 F. Supp at 871. The U.S. Steel Court relied on the ruling in Atlantic Sugar Ltd.
v. United States, 85 Cust. Ct. 133 (1980), that in-house counsel should not have access to
confidential business information unless no other reasonable way of sufficiently challenging
the administrative duty determination exists. 569 F. Supp. at 871.
'9 U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 82-10-01361, slip op. 84-12 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Feb. 24, 1984).
20 730 F.2d at 1465.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(1) (1982). Section 1292(d)(1) provides:
When the chief judge of the Court of International Trade issues an order
under the provisions of section 256(b) of this title, or when any judge of the Court
of International Trade, in issuing any other interlocutory order, includes in the
order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved with respect to
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cision of Republic Steel Corp. v. United States.22 In Republic
Steel, the Court of International Trade followed its earlier opinion
in U.S. Steel. 3 The Federal Circuit vacated and returned Republic
Steel after determining that "access may [not] be granted to re-
tained and denied to in-house counsel solely on a presumption that
inadvertent disclosure by the latter is more likely. 24
Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Markey recognized that
no specific group of lawyers is more or less likely inadvertently to
disobey a protective order.2> The court resolved that individual ac-
tivities, associations, and relationships with a party must be con-
sidered to determine the likelihood of inadvertent disclosure. 6 The
majority observed that both retained and in-house counsel are sub-
ject to the Code of Professional Responsibility and are officers of
the court.27 Moreover, the court found that protective orders can
be formulated "in light of the particular counsel's relationship and
activities" with the client.28 Finally, Chief Judge Markey added
that the court's decision did not affect the ITC rule barring in-
house counsel from receiving confidential information in adminis-
trative proceedings.29
In dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Nichols opined that Judge
Watson avoided conflicting rules by keeping the procedure of the
which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immedi-
ate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may, in
its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made
to that Court within ten days after the entry of such order.
Id.
22 572 F. Supp. 275, 277 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), vacated, 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
23 See id. at 276. Judge Watson, writing the memorandum opinion and order of Repub-
lic Steel, "incorporate[d] [the] opinion" of U.S. Steel. See id.
24 730 F.2d at 1469. The decision of the Federal Circuit merely nullified the basis for
denial given by the Court of International Trade, it did not reverse the denial of access. Id.
25 See id. at 1468.
21 See id. The Federal Circuit recognized that some retained counsel serve in a variety
of capacities for their clients. See id. Chief Judge Markey cited occasional membership by
retained counsel on the corporate board of directors as an example of such close
relationships.
27 See id. The majority described in-house counsel's position as "provid[ing] the same
services and [being] subject to the same types of pressures as retained counsel." See id. The
court noted that both must avoid inadvertent disclosure. See id.
28 See id. The Federal Circuit reasoned that individual circumstances must govern the
development of a protective order rather than the status of counsel. See id. The court con-
cluded that if in-house counsel took part in competitive decisionmaking, the party seeking
access could be compelled to seek outside counsel or be denied access. See id.
29 See id.
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Court in conformity with that of the ITCY° The dissent noted that
those who originally supplied the information did not want it to be
given to in-house counsel.3 ' In addition, Judge Nichols foresaw
that the scrutiny of counsel's relationship with business policy that
would have to be performed could cast doubt on the competency of
members of the court's bar.32 Thus, the dissent set forth the fol-
lowing alternatives to the procedure adopted by the majority: de-
nial to all counsel if information is sensitive enough for denial at
all, and the use of an expert to inform the Court of the contents of
the documents without revealing business secrets.33
Although trade secrets are not privileged, 34 their confidential-
ity generally has been protected by the courts.3 5 Obviously, the
greatest need for protection exists when disclosure is sought by a
competitor of the owner of the trade secret.3 6 The Court of Inter-
30 See id. at 1469 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
31 See id. (Nichols, J., dissenting). Judge Nichols reasoned that the opinions of those
who originally supplied the information are important because if they decide that the litiga-
tion is unfair, these parties will withdraw from the forum and seek retaliatory action against
United States trade by their own government. See id. (Nichols, J., dissenting).
32 See id. at 1469-70 (Nichols, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that "[tihe CIT
judge will have to lay out a pretty rigid method of trial of this issue, one that will keep
things within seemly limits and not take forever to implement, thus limiting the damage to
what is endurable." Id. at 1470 (Nichols, J., dissenting).
" See id. (Nichols, J., dissenting). Judge Nichols observed that if a party refused to
retain outside counsel, justice would not be denied. See id. (Nichols, J., dissenting). Rather,
the dissent argued that the result would be that the party would be denied the benefit of in-
house counsel's advocacy. See id. (Nichols, J., dissenting). Judge Nichols concluded that in
such a case, the court must examine the material "in camera, and arrive at a just and lawful
decision." Id. (Nichols, J., dissenting).
"4 Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); La Chemise Lacoste v. General Mills, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 596, 605 (D. Del. 1971), afJ'd,
487 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1973); Note, supra note 3, at 347. Once a trade secret is disclosed,
there is no way to prevent further public dissemination. Note, supra note 3, at 347.
31 See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965); La Chemise Lacoste v. General Mills, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 596, 605
(D. Del. 1971), aff'd, 487 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1973); American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petro-
leum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 683-85 (D.R.I. 1959). Courts acknowledge that trade secrets
deserve protection, but the tendency is to limit disclosure to certain personnel rather than
to preclude disclosure altogether. See, e.g., Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En
Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The Court of International Trade has taken
a more liberal attitude toward disclosure than that taken by the agencies. Garfinkel, supra
note 1, at 481.
36 See Note, supra note 3, at 347. Certain types of "trade secrets" are more dangerous
in the hands of a competitor than are other trade secrets; for example, patents, secret
processes, and customer lists have been deemed worthy of more careful protection. See, e.g.,
Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 999 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
964 (1965); United States v. American Optical Co., 39 F.R.D. 580, 586 (N.D. Cal. 1966);
American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prods. Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 683-84 (D.R.I. 1959).
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national Trade is often called upon to determine the propriety of
disclosure to business competitors, as they are most often the par-
ties with standing to oppose an antidumping or countervailing
duty determination. 7 In U.S. Steel, the Federal Circuit rejected
the view that" 'it is humanly impossible to control the inadvertent
disclosure of some confidential information in any prolonged work-
ing relationship.' "38 This Comment will explore the validity of this
judgment and conclude that mechanically precluding in-house
counsel from involvement in litigation before the Court of Interna-
tional Trade whenever there is confidential material involved is an
unnecessary interference with the party's right to choose counsel.
In addition, the Comment will show that the case by case approach
of U.S. Steel is consistent with tests used in areas of the law where
confidential material is guarded strictly.
The U.S. Steel court recognized that the role of corporate
counsel varies according to the organization involved and the indi-
vidual attorneys concerned 39 For example, U.S. Steel claimed that
Conversely, certain factors make it less crucial to protect a trade secret. For instance, an
older secret is not as valuable. United States v. American Optical Co., 39 F.R.D. 580, 586
(N.D. Cal. 1966). Recent changes in the Court of International Trade have created an expe-
dited procedure whereby court review is achieved within a few months, and this increases
the risk that information contained in the record will still be valuable.
37 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982). Foreign or domestic manufacturers, producers and ex-
porters or importers of a "like product" to the one under investigation by the ITC and the
Commerce Department constitute the majority of the "parties in interest" with standing to
seek judicial review of a dumping determination. See id.; supra note 4.
One commentator stated that the possibility of obtaining confidential information from
the Court of International Trade operates as a motivating factor to the initiation of suits for
judicial review. Garfinkel, supra note 1, at 484-85. A similar problem has arisen under the
Freedom of Information Act (the FOIA). Government agencies are provided information by
the business community. All information in the files of an agency is obtainable by any mem-
ber of the public under the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). It has been noted that the
FOIA has been misused and that a great percentage of the requests under the FOIA are
made by competitors of the corporation that submitted the information. Note, supra note 3,
at 347-50.
11 730 F.2d at 1467 (quoting U.S. Steel, 569 F. Supp. at 872). The Court of Interna-
tional Trade, in U.S. Steel, believed that the protracted interaction between in-house coun-
sel and its corporate employer would render inevitable disclosure of some confidential mate-
rial. See 569 F. Supp. at 872. The court acknowledged that a similar set of circumstances
could exist in some situations where retained counsel is involved. See id. The court con-
cluded, however, that it would be impossible to have adversary proceedings if outside coun-
sel were disqualified on this basis. See id.
" 730 F.2d at 1468; see J. DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL 77 (1970); supra note 26
and accompanying text. There are conflicting views of the role a corporate lawyer should
take in resolving business problems. J. DONNELL, supra, at 77. Some commentators are of
the opinion that the corporate lawyer should volunteer his opinion whenever it would be
helpful. Id.; see Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the Corporate Account-
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in-house counsel confined their activity to a well-defined group of
purely legal services and did not participate in decisionmaking or
the formulation of policy.4 0 Similarly, many other corporations
have legal departments that are large enough to permit complete
functional differentiation.41 However, many corporations also re-
tain outside counsel with an expectation that the attorney will be-
come involved in policymaking and business decisions.4 2 In addi-
ability Process, 4 CORP. L. REv. 3, 3 (1981) (corporate counsel helps to determine corporate
policy). Others believe that the lawyer should volunteer an opinion only if invited to con-
tribute, while some view the corporate lawyer's role as limited to one of legal guidance with-
out contributions to business problems even if solicited. J. DONNELL, supra, at 77. In 1976,
the Chief Executive Officer of Southern Bell remarked to the Committee on Corporate Law
Forums at the annual American Bar Association meeting that he expected his corporate
counsel to "combine legal expertise with business experience, or perhaps a better term is
business exposure-our business." Rast, What the Chief Executive Looks for in his Corpo-
rate Law Department, 33 Bus. LAW. 811, 813 (1978). Furthermore, Rast emphasized that
these attorneys should take an active role in the decisionmaking process by volunteering
their opinions in operating matters. See id. at 814. The caveat added by this chief executive
officer was that the attorneys should volunteer opinions only "to the extent that it draws on
[their] professional knowledge." Id. At times, inside counsel is expected to be an integral
part of a corporation with a keen eye toward maximizing profit and not the "keeper of the
corporate conscience." Hershman, Special Problems of Inside Counsel for Financial Insti-
tutions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1435, 1436 (1978). Various corporations encourage involvement by
corporate attorneys in the business sphere. E.g., F.T.C. v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1350
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (corporate counsel former member of board of directors of corporation);
F.T.C. v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (D.D.C. 1969) (attor-
ney also secretary of corporation); see also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Con-
tracts Litig., 76 F.R.D. 47, 57 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (corporate counsel usually consulted in
atmosphere of both business and law). The "team player" attitude, however, may not be as
pervasive in extremely regulated institutions such as the financial industry. Hershman,
supra, at 1436.
40 Lempert, supra note 16, at 5, col. 3. The corporate counsel for U.S. Steel pursued
activities that included "advis[ing] management on legal consequences, ensur[ing] compli-
ance with laws and regulations, and handl[ing] corporate litigation." Id.
41 See Lempert, supra note 40, at 5, col. 3 (Bethlehem Steel); see also Ferrara & Stein-
berg, supra note 39, at 22 (inside counsel acting as director should participate at board
meeting only in the capacity of counsel); Wilczek, Corporate Confidentiality: Problems and
Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 7 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 221, 241 (1982) (in-house counsel's files
should be maintained separately); cf. Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 39, at 22 (indepen-
dent professional judgment must be adhered to even if opposes predominant view of man-
agement or board of directors); Hershman, supra, note 39, at 1450 (impossible dual role of
legal advisor and board director when expected to make business decisions on board).
412 See Wilczek, supra note 41, at 239. Because of professional responsibilities, restric-
tions may be placed on attorneys in private law firms concerning their involvement in corpo-
rate management. See, e.g., Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Firm, 33 Bus. LAW. 1549,
1552 (1978). For example, a limitation imposed by one law firm prohibited an attorney from
becoming a director in any corporation if the law firm "act[ed] as principal outside counsel
or as securities law counsel." Id. A further limitation to avoid disclosure of competitive
secrets is to disallow directorships of corporations in the same industry as other clients. Id.
IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
tion to allowing disclosure to in-house counsel in instances where
the actual risk of unwarranted disclosure is not increased,43 the
U.S. Steel court has avoided setting the dangerous precedent of
relaxing the right of outside counsel to receive information without
an adequate investigation into the true relationship and the con-
comitant likelihood of disclosure.
There are a number of factors that mitigate the danger of dis-
closure by inside counsel.44 As noted by the U.S. Steel court, in-
house counsel is under a duty equivalent to that of any attorney to
act as an officer of the court.45 Additionally, improper use of confi-
dential material by an attorney would constitute a violation of a
protective order, subjecting the attorney not only to professional
discipline,46 but to the contempt power of the court as well.47 It is
suggested that these factors provide a clear disincentive to the in-
tentional misuse of confidential information.
In Baxter Travenol Laboratories v. LeMay,45 the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio was faced with a predica-
ment similar to the situation before the Court of International
Trade in U.S. Steel. In Baxter Travenol, the plaintiffs in an anti-
trust case requested disclosure to in-house counsel of material
claimed by the defendant to be confidential. 49 In reviewing the ap-
propriate case law, the Baxter Travenol court recognized the right
of a plaintiff to provide his "trial" counsel with information neces-
730 F.2d at 1468; cf. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 76
F.R.D. 47, 57 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (much weight should be given to the argument that corpo-
rate counsel is "never consulted in a non-business atmosphere").
44 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
41 See Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 39, at 6 (employee status of in-house counsel
does not decrease professional obligation); supra note 27 and accompanying text. In-house
counsel must keep confidential any material so ordered by a court. See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
4 See Lempert, supra note 16, at 5, col. 2. The ITC and the Commerce Department
have instituted an extensive protective order "application form" to be filled out in an-
tidumping and countervailing duty proceedings if the interested party's attorney desires
confidential information. Garfinkel, supra note 2, at 18, col. 2. The attorney must fully ex-
plain why the information is being sought and must show good reason for its release, and, in
addition, must swear in a personal statement that he will not reveal the information to any
partner, officer, agent, or employee of his client and that the information will be used solely
for the purpose of the litigation. Id. at 18, cols. 2-3. The statement acknowledges that a
breach of confidentiality may subject the attorney to disbarment from practice before the
agency. Id. at 18, col. 3.
47 See, e.g., Garfinkel, supra note 1, at 491-92 (discussing Pasco Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 477 F. Supp. 201 (Cust. Ct. 1979)).
48 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
40 See id. at 419.
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sary to pursue the litigation." The court also took heed of the
competing right of the defendant to avoid disclosure to the plain-
tiff's in-house counsel.51 Rejecting the notion that an attorney is
incapable of differentiating between the proper and improper use
of information,52 the Baxter Travenol court focused upon the abil-
ity of the particular attorney "to differentiate his conduct in per-
forming" his roles as adviser and as litigator.53
It is suggested that an ad hoc test, such as applied in Baxter
Travenol and as set forth in U.S. Steel, should be applied to all
confidential information disputes to determine whether an attor-
ney should be accorded access to the opposing party's confidential
information contained in the administrative record. A case by case
approach can guard against the automatic grant of access to unde-
serving retained attorneys,54 and, rather than presuming impropri-
ety simply because the attorney is an employee of the corporation,
" See id.; accord Triangle Ink & Color Co. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 61 F.R.D. 634, 636
(N.D. Ill. 1974) (high-tech trade secrets revealed only to plaintiff's attorneys); Scovill Mfg.
Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 61 F.R.D. 598, 602 (D. Del. 1973) (confidential matter available
under protective order). The Baxter Travenol court defined "trial counsel" as the "attor-
neys charged with the responsibility for and actively engaged in preparation and litigation
of the case." 89 F.R.D. at 419.
" See 89 F.R.D. at 419. The Baxter Travenol court stated that the right of defendants
to avoid disclosure to plaintiff's in-house counsel derived from the "potential for abuse of
such information through use in the ordinary course of in-house counsel's performance for
the corporation." Id.
11 See id. at 420.
53 Id. at 419-20 (emphasis omitted). The Baxter Travenol court found that an apparent
conflict existed between the "Plaintiffs' qualified right to preparation of the case by counsel
of their choosing, and the potential for abuse of that right by virtue of Plaintiffs' choice of
in-house counsel." Id. at 419. While noting that normally the qualified right would give way
in such circumstances, the court determined that the conflict, although apparent, was not
real. See id. The court held that the only real conflict occurs when the attorney "cannot be
expected to differentiate his conduct in performing each role." Id. at 420 (emphasis in
original). Thus, the Baxter Travenol court viewed the actual issue as whether the particular
in-house attorney "can be expected to use confidential matters obtained in his role as 'trial
counsel' only in the prosecution of this litigation, and not use such information for the cor-
porations' 'other' purposes in his role as 'in-house counsel.'" Id.
'4 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The Court of International Trade noted
that the inability to segregate confidential information "can also apply to retained counsel
in certain situations." 569 F. Supp. at 872. The Court determined, however, that
it is impossible. . . to extend this reasoning to its logical conclusion and still have
adversary proceedings and judicial review . . . . So the distinction between in-
house counsel and retained counsel is made because with respect to the former, a
closer and more sustained relationship can be presumed as an outgrowth of the
employer-employee relationship. It follows that a meaningful increment of protec-
tion can be obtained by excluding in-house counsel.
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the ad hoc approach assures that the party seeking access is per-
mitted to have his in-house attorney represent him unless it is
shown that to do so would be improper.5 5 Indeed, in Baxter Trave-
nol, an investigation revealed to the court that in-house counsel
would use the information solely for litigation purposes,56 even
though the attorney was alleged to be one of the conspirators in
the anticompetitive behavior forming the basis of the suit.5 7
Since litigation before the Court of International Trade is not
the only situation where disclosure of trade secrets is threatened or
requested, it is suggested that, in carrying out the decision of U.S.
Steel, the techniques used by the district courts in other litigation
should be consulted. Discovery disputes exemplify the various situ-
ations in which a party, in order to prepare its case, may request
disclosure of confidential trade secrets of its competitors. 58 It is
suggested that the Court of International Trade should draw from
this body of case law, both for the sake of consistency and for the
inherent value of these decisions.5 9 It is submitted that a case by
case analysis of the actual likelihood of disclosure will further the
objective of maintaining confidentiality and, at the same time, pro-
mote disclosure where proper use of the information can be as-
sured. In applying this ad hoc test, it is suggested that there are
factors that can realistically apprise the Court of the risk of im-
proper public disclosure of the information: the actual degree of
isolation of the attorney from policy and decisionmaking within
the corporation; prior compliance with protective orders; the attor-
" See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
'" 89 F.R.D. at 420.
" Id. The Baxter Travenol defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were prosecuting the
claim for anticompetitive purposes. Id. The court rejected the contention that mere involve-
ment by the attorney in the litigation was an "improper" use of the information, holding
that there was "no reason to question the reasonable expectation that [the attorney] will
conform his uses of [the confidential] information to [the] differentiation" between the
proper and the improper uses of the information. Id.
G" See, e.g., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (antitrust); Bax-
ter Travenol Laboratories v. LeMay, 89 F.R.D. 410, 419-20 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (antitrust);
Chesa Int'l Ltd. v. Fashion Assocs., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 234, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (trademark
infringment), afl'd mem., 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977). In Service Liquor Distribs., Inc. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 16 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), the court stated that "in an action
under the antitrust laws, based upon an alleged abuse of competition, a competitor's busi-
ness records, where good cause has been shown, are not only not immune from inquiry, but
they are precisely the source of the most relevant evidence." Id. at 509.
', Cf. FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (although a distinction may
be made between in-house and outside counsel, scope of protective order rests within discre-
tion of trial judge on a case-by-case basis).
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ney's reputation and prior behavior as indicative of likelihood of
future compliance with protective orders; and, finally, the Court's
judgment of the attorney's credibility. It is submitted that by ap-
plying these criteria, the Court can adequately investigate and,
therefore, protect trade secrets. In the Court of International
Trade decision, Judge Watson did not question the ethics of the
in-house counsel for U.S. Steel; rather, the Court took note of the
flawless record of the attorneys in following protective orders.60 In
addition, Judge Watson recognized that these attorneys did not
participate directly in pricing or competitive decisionmaking. 61
Thus, it is likely that these factors were considered when the Court
of International Trade, in light of the Federal Circuit decision,
subsequently determined that the risk of disclosure was minimal,
and, therefore, that it was unnecessary for U.S. Steel to retain
outside counsel as a prerequisite to the disclosure of the needed
information.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Steel court's formation of a case by case analysis for
disclosure of confidential information will guard against unwar-
ranted disclosure to outside counsel and the subsequent preclusion
of disclosure to deserving in-house attorneys. No longer will the
efforts of corporations to increase the use of inside counsel be hin-
dered. Greater involvement by in-house counsel in the full spec-
trum of the legal affairs of a corporation has become a valuable
way to reduce legal expenses and to use the expertise of inside at-
torneys. An ad hoc analysis of the risk of improper disclosure will
prevent prejudice to the owner of the trade secret and, at the same
time, provide the corporation with an unhindered right to counsel
of its choice.
Marie J. McIntyre
60 See 569 F. Supp. at 872. The Court of International Trade noted that "[the integrity
of counsel for U.S. Steel is unquestioned and their unblemished record of adherence to pro-
tective orders is acknowledged." Id.
61 See id.
[Vol. 58:890
